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BOOK REVIEW
Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill. By Michael Peszke. Charles
C. Thomas, Publ., 1975.
The development of coherent bodies of procedural' and substantive'
mental health case law, coupled with the creation of a meaningful,
advocacy-centered mental health rights bar,' has been among the most
significant system-wide legal developments of the past five to ten years.
This new body of judicial decisions and legislative enactments has
clearly had a "ripple effect" far beyond the doors of the courtroom
and the State House. 4  Mental health reformers have traditionally been
philosophers,' doctors,' penologists,7 and, simply "reformers."'8  Since
lawyers are, regrettably, newcomers to the area of mental health service
delivery,9 it is not surprising that they are now bearing the brunt of
much criticism, the significant portion of which emanates from the
medical profession. Having been faced with a flood of source books,1"
* The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. A small por-
tion of this review will appear in a forthcoming issue of the JOURNAL OF HOSPITAL AND
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY.
1. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
2. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp.
373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Watt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
3. See, e.g., NEW YORK MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 88 (McKinney 1971); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52:27E-21 etseq. (Supp. 1976).
4. For discussions of the impact of significant court decisions on patient life at
institutions, see, e.g., Ennis, New York Signs Far-Reaching Consent Decree in the "Wil-
lowbrook" Case, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW 1 (June 1975); Johnson, Court
Decisions and the Social Services, 20 SOCIAL WORK 343 (1975).
5. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
6. See, e.g., I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY
(1838).
7. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, ch. 10 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as ROTHMAN].
8. For a discussion of Dorothea Dix, one of the most significant of the nineteenth
century reformers, see ROTHMAN, supra note 7, at 187-202.
9. For criticisms of the traditional role of attorneys in mental health litigation,
see, e.g., Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424 (1966); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil
Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816 (1974).
10. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED (P.L.I. ed. 1973).
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supermarket rack paperbacks," scholarly tradebooks,' 2 legal case
books, 3 and professional journal articles,' 4 the doctors are now respond-
ing, often with similarly thoughtful works.' 5 It is perhaps inevitable
that, as part of the new wave of medical writing, at least one doctor
has chosen to retrench, take the offensive, and turn the problem around,
so as to lay the blame at the feet of the interlopers: the lawyers.
In this specific context, then, Michael Peszke's Involuntary Treat-
ment of the Mentally ll is a work which should be greatly disturb-
ing to mental health professionals and attorneys who deal with the men-
tal health system. The word "disturbing" is chosen carefully: Peszke's
central thesis is a philosophically provocative one with certain legitimate
underpinnings, but some of his secondary assumptions and corollary
theories are nothing less than frightening in their implications.
Peszke, a doctor, approaches the problem of involuntary commit-
ment as a problem of autonomy: while the legal system, he argues,
views involuntary treatment with "repugnance,"' 7 the medical profes-
sion desires to treat, and cure, illness to insure that autonomy "which
is [otherwise] impeded and constricted by the coercion of mental ill-
ness."' 8  Basically, he posits a nearly unresolvable dichotomy between
the medical model (mental illness is a disease and the sick should
be treated) and what he perceives as the anti-psychiatric, legal model
(mental illness does not exist, "[a]ll behavior is under volitional con-
trol," and all citizens may behave as they please as long as they "are
not in direct confrontation with social goals")." In order for involun-
tary commitment to exist, it must be proved that mental illness exists
and that it "affects the decisionmaking process of the organism .... ,,20
His ultimate thesis is that mental illness does exist as a disease which
coerces free will. Because of this coercion, it thus makes neither "moral
11. See, e.g., B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIA-
TRISTS AND THE LAW (1972); B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS:
THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A MENTAL PATIENT'S RIGHTS (1973).
12. See, e.g., R. MARTIN, LEGAL CHALLENGES TO BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1975).
13. See, e.g., A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
(1974); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHowITz, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND
LAw (1967).
14. See, e.g., Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Cham-
bers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Con-
stitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972).
15. See, e.g., A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
(1975) [hereinafter cited as STONE].
16. M. PESZKE, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1975) [herein-
after cited as INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT]. Peszke seems to view the legal profession as
a one-minded monolith, ascribing the purported public positions of well-known patient
advocate Bruce Ennis to all practicing attorneys.
17. Id. at vii.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 74.
20. Id. at 55.
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[n]or logical sense" to limit involuntary commitment to the dangerous.21
Although this is, as indicated above, a provocative position, the rea-
soning process which supports it is less than totally persuasive, while
the process by which Peszke rejects what he posits as the contrary
view is nothing less than bizarre.
According to Peszke, asylums developed because of the "intuitive
conviction of society" that certain persons needed help which "only
the medical profession had the tradition, the wisdom, and the humani-
tarian interest to assume."22  For many people, he assures us, these
asylums were "a perfectly desirable place in which to live."23 With this
background, he sets out the physician's role:
For the physician, the patient who comes for help deserves treat-
ment, and if he needs treatment, the physician has a moral and an
inherent medical obligation to provide such treatment to the best of
his ability.
24
As "mental illness is no different from any other form of disease, ' 2
treatment should be "as aggressive and comprehensive as is the treat-
ment of heart failure, a bleeding peptic ulcer or hypertension. '26
Thus, there exist "certain forms of emotional disorders '27 which "are
as much a disease as are multiple sclerosis and cancer!"2  This sort
of mental illness, or psychosis:
21. Id. at 61.
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id. at 22. For a less sanguine view, see, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 7,
at 283 ("mhe very elements which contributed to the erosion of a rehabilitative asylum
helped to insure the perpetuation of a custodial one"); see also F. PivEN & R. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE PooR 34 n.66 (Vintage ed. 1972), referring to K. DE SCHWEINITZ,
ENGLAND'S ROAD TO SOCIAL SECuRrrY 66 (1943) (a 1767 House of Commons investiga-
tion found that only seven of 100 infants born or received into workhouses survived two
years).
This topic highlights a major ambiguity in the author's approach to the subject matter:
initially, he notes that "when hospitalization was custodial and treatment minimal, then
due process protection was imperative." INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 10
(emphasis added); elsewhere, he accurately describes many state facilities (in the
present tense) as "medieval horrors." Id. at 67. Yet, after he describes the rise of
the asylum "as a perfectly desirable place," he notes "[tihis is still the case for
many . . . ." Id. at 22. The conflict between these statements is unresolved, and the
issue of the relationship between the presence of adequate treatment and the rate of
involuntary commitment, see e.g., STONE, supra note 15, at 43, 67, is ignored.
24. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 28. This of course, presupposes a
freedom of choice on the part of the patient, a freedom that is totally nonexistent in the
case of most involuntary patients, and, in terms of a competitive marketplace, non-
existent for many voluntary patients as well.
25. Id.
26. Id. For an interesting treatment of the possible psychological origins of all
of Peszke's comparative examples, see S. SILVERMAN, PSYCHOLOGIC CUES IN FORE-
CAST G PHYSICAL ILLNESS 211, 335, 357 (1970).
27. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 51. Contrarily, he finds that the
"variety of personality disorders and neuroses that have . . . fallen within the purview of
psychiatry. . . are not forms of mental illness." Id. at 52.
28. Id. at 51. The incessant use of misplaced exclamation points in the text is
at times a major irritant.
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affects the decisionmaking process of the organism, it affects his
mind, disturbs his intellectual ability such as memory, concentration,
abstract .thinking and judgment, disturbs the process of logical thought,
impairs verbal communication, affects the symbolic process and alien-
ates the victim from his environment and from himself. 29
Coupled with "the genetic biological attributes of the disease process,
the fact that [mental illness] can be diagnosed on objective and sub-
jective grounds and that it can be treated most effectively through
biological means [thus proving it] to be a disease entity," 30 leads Peszke
to the inescapable conclusion that, when such conditions are present,
it is not necessary that dangerousness be a criterion of commitment.3
Following this vigorous defense of the medical model, Peszke attacks
the corpus of anti-psychiatric criticism and the involvement of lawyers
in the entire involuntary civil commitment process, with what must
sadly be characterized as vitriol, in a way which reflects a near total
miscomprehension of the role of the legal system not just as it relates
to psychiatry but as it relates to the entire fabric of American society.
The attack is sufficiently inappropriate (and startling) as to call into
question the value of the remainder of the author's work.
Peszke suggests that the problem of inappropriate commitments is
a minor one: the concern of being "'railroaded'" is atavistic, and
historical evidence is "scanty. ' 3- The waters have been muddied by
the "attorney [who] brings in the philosophy of criminal law, 33 and
who argues that involuntary hospitalization should be limited to the
dangerous.34 He then criticizes a New York Civil Liberties Union
legislative memo, which he implicitly assumes speaks for all practic-
ing mental health attorneys. The memo argues that mental illness
alone can never be a justifiable reason for involuntary deprivation of
a person's liberty and property, to which he responds "Why Not?"3"
29. Id. at 55.
30. Id. at 60.
31. Id. at 61. Such a requirement, he finds, would be "like arguing that the con-
cussed victim should be treated if he is causing a nuisance, but otherwise ignored and
left alone." Id. For a similar articulation of the author's position, see Peszke, Is
Dangerousness an Issue for Physicians in Emergency Commitment?, 132 AM. J. PSY-
CHIAT. 825, 827 (1975).
For an analysis of the role of counsel at involuntary civil commitment proceedings
and the reactions by psychiatrists thereto, see Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal
Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of Professions,
10 J. HEALTH AND Soc. BEHAV. 66, 71 (1969).
32. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 69-70. Cf., e.g., ROTHMAN, supra
note 7, at 143 ("[O]nce medical superintendents received a patient, they were usually able
to separate him fairly systematically from the outside world").
33. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 75. The philosophy referred to
is that of "innocent until proven guilty, therefore free of mental illness until proven
to have it!" Id.
34. Id. at 76.
35. id. at 77.
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Peszke further criticizes the memo's use of the due process clause
as an argument against such involuntary hospitalization, a clause which
he suggests refers only to criminal matters.8" He concludes that the
NYCLU "appear[s] to assume . . . that a psychotic, troubled individ-
ual would prefer to stay that way rather than to get better. '3 7
From this relatively narrow set of premises, Peszke moves to the
real target of his assault: the entire legal profession. Relying heavily
on De Toqueville's writings, 8 the author states his central thesis:
I posit that the legal profession wishes to claim exclusive control over
all social and political aspects of life in the United States. Hence, in
this area of social implication of medical practice-namely, involuntary
hospitalization and the issues of informed consent stemming from it-
the attorneys 'have challenged medicine and have extended their pro-
fessional interest! 9
Because the judiciary "is not under the control of any group except
of the legal profession," Peszke questions "whether the United States
is really a democracy."40  Finally, he suggests that, in the long run,
the issue of involuntary commitment may be the Maginot Line for the
future of the American people: "It may be that the issue of the men-
tally ill is the place to stop the growing tyranny of law . ... 1
Peszke suggests that "much of the agitation . . . directed at the
medical profession and psychiatry . . . has to do with the legal pro-
fession's wishing to establish its own control over this very powerful
social tool."42  He characterizes the legal attitude towards the men-
tally ill as "one of extreme naivet6, exaggerated ideological concern
mixed with complete and absolute disinterest; '4 3 he follows up this
nearly incomprehensible definition by suggesting that, whereas an at-
torney would be unlikely to use his judgment, for instance, "in the
interpretation of the figures for calculating the construction of a bridge,
. . . it is quite clear that the average attorney is convinced that his
own judgment, his own expertise, and his own professional background
is sufficiently expert to enable him to make judgments on intrapsychic
and interpersonal behavior."44
36. Id. Contra, note 62 and accompanying text infra.
37. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 79.
38. Ironically, speaking recently at a Princeton University conference on institu-
tional issues, Dr. David Rothman referred to De Tocqueville to a completely contrary
end:
De Tocqueville came here to see the prisons and thought the United States was the
wave of the future, but, as it has turned out, all that we did was to move the
whipping post inside and invent more gadgets to go with it.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1976, at 35, col. 7 (New Jersey ed.).
39. INVOLUNTARY TRATMENT, supra note 16, at 93.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 94.
42. id. at 95.
43. id. at 98.
44. Id. at 100.
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These astonishing arguments are then, curiously, followed by a
short inconclusive chapter discussing comparative studies of involun-
tary treatment in other countries, and by suggestions for the future
which include such reasonable recommendations as the need for the
medical profession to formulate ethical standards,4" creation of a
mental health tribunal to review cases following emergency deten-
tions,4" the discontinuation of rural based psychiatric facilities,47 cen-
tralization of urban emergency reception centers,4 8 and "a good five-
dollars-an-hour psychotherapist." 9  On the other hand, Peszke also
suggests, albeit sardonically, that if the legal profession feels that its
"inherent constitutionally given right to protect the freedom of citi-
zens . . .give[s] [it] . .. a 'first crack' at a patient, then, indeed in
those jurisdictions the medical profession should leave the emergency
room and psychiatric problem to the attorney."5
He concludes by returning to a few final anti-legal salvos: many
of the attorneys practicing mental health law exhibit "naivet6 and
arrogance" while failing to come up with practical or constructive
alternatives; 1 the average doctor perceives the average attorney "as a
man who will distort the truth,"52 as one whose scholarship shows "gross
ignorance or even a conscious malevolence and dishonesty alien to
worthy scholarship;"5 " and, finally, the law student's interest in law
and psychiatry is not "to learn the strength and attributes of the legal
profession or to study human problems," but "to learn how to pick holes
and to show the psychiatrist up in court." '54
What is to be done with such a concoction of polemic, misunder-
standing and anger, especially when it is obviously written seriously
and when it is coupled with suggestions which do, when they stand
alone, make sense?55
At the outset, Peszke's comments on the ramifications of the involve-
ment of lawyers need a speedy rebuttal on a factual level. The problem
of inappropriate commitment is not a historical curiosity-contempo-
raneous studies have shown that significant percentages of state hos-
pital patients (the number varies from 43% to 68% to 75%) could
be safely treated elsewhere.56  Also, and perhaps just as significantly,
45. Id. at 114. Cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 46-51, 355 A.2d 647, 667-69 (1976).
46. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 12.
47. id. at 125.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 126.
50. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 133.
52. Id. at 134-35.
53. Id. at 135. Here he refers specifically, but not by name, to Ennis.
54. Id. at 136.
55. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
56. See, e.g., T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 168 (7th ed. 1973) (the presence of
1274 [Vol. 29
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studies nearly unanimously show that psychiatrists are no more ac-
curate in predicting dangerousness than are nonpsychiatrists.57 The
argument that the attorney "brings in the philosophy of the criminal
law" 8 is similarly misplaced: it is rather, the existence of legislative
statutory enactments which permit involuntary hospitalization in the
first place (in the absence of which the issue would never arise).
Certainly, not even Peszke would suggest that the psychiatric profes-
sion, acting ultra vires, has the inherent right to establish inpatient
hospitals (presumably state funded and run) to which persons can be
sent without legal recourse. It is unthinkable that such power can
legitimately exist without the assent of the people as reflected in the
actions of the individual state legislatures. "9
Peszke's rhetorical "Why Not" (in responding to the NYCLU
criticism of hospitalization on the basis of illness alone) ignores politi-
cal reality by sidestepping the historic decision of the United States
Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson,0 which finally and forever
put to rest the question of the justiciability of treatment issues.6 ' Also,
43% of patients in hospitals studied could not be explained in terms of their psychiatric
condition); Abraham & Bucker, Preliminary Findings from Psychiatric Inventory, 1971
(unpublished) (68% of patient population at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington
not considered dangerous to themselves or others); Mendel, Brief Hospitalization Tech-
niques, 6 CURRENT PSvCnIATRIC THERAPIES 310 (1966) (75% of patients studied with
diagnosis of schizophrenia could be suitably discharged), all cited in Ferleger, A Patients'
Rights Organization: Advocacy and Collective Action by and for Inmates of Mental
Institutions, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 597 n.l (1975). See also Dixon v. Weinberger, 405
F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975), in which a Federal judge in Washington, D.C., ordered St.
Elizabeth's Hospital to devise a plan by which it could release 43% of its inpatients to
less restrictive, more appropriate community facilities.
57. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE
VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 23-30 (1975); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric
Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084
(1976); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 749 (1974) (no evidence found that a psy-
chiatrist can predict dangerousness more than a lawyer); Rappeport, Lassen and Gruen-
wald, Evaluation and Follow-up of Hospital Patients Who Had Sanity Hearings.
CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 89 (Rappeport
ed. 1969) ("The comparison between court released and hospital released adjustment
rates shows no significant difference in the predictive accuracy of either institution").
Although Peszke concedes that there is a "certain amount of accuracy, if not always
of good taste," INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 76 (emphasis added), in
this position, he demurs to it. His fallback position remains that dangerousness should
not be the key determinant in involuntary hospitalization decisions. Id. at 76-77.
58. Id. at 75. See note 33 supra.
59. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-23 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
In Briggs v. Mandel, Docket No. 115A/40/A-54664 (Md. Bait. County Cir. Ct., Feb.
28, 1975), the court ordered that state's Office of the Public Defender to assign counsel
to represent indigent persons subject to involuntary civil commitment, noting that, if a
plan was not implemented to provide such services within a four-month period, no person
could be involuntarily committed without such counsel after the cut-off date. Slip op.
at 16.
60. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
61. The Supreme Court characterized the position similar to Peszke's as "unper-
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his suggestion that the "life, liberty or property" due process clause
applies only to criminal matters is, of course, absolutely and unequivo-
cally wrong."2 These examples are not isolated; they are indicative of
the biases which color his entire approach."'
The author's final attacks on what he apparently sees as the psycho-
pathology of the attorney's personality require little comment except
as they, again, reflect his curious scholarship. In explaining why
lawyers feel they can preempt psychiatrists, Peszke notes, "[m]any
[attorneys] have taken psychology and sociology courses which have
exposed them to certain levels of thinking in the area of the social
sciences."' ' " His explanatory footnote asserts:
It has been commented that at the undergraduate college level, courses
in sociology and psychology are taught by young, often quite radical
faculty, who are very venomous in their condemnation of society in
general and medicine in particular.05
suasive," and added:
Where "treatment" is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty,
it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine
whether the asserted ground is present.
Id. at 574 n.10.
62. At the outset, the distinction between criminal, quasi-criminal and civil pro-
ceedings is no longer a meaningful one when issues such as liberty are involved. See,
e.g., It re Gault, 387 U.S. i (1967). Beyond this, of course, the due process clause
clearly applies to civil law in matters involving duration of commitment of the men-
tally ill, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); treatment of the mentally ill, Wyatt
v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), ajf'd sub
noma. Wyatt v. Aderhold, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); and the full range of other
matters in which a person's "life, liberty, or property" is involved. See, e.g., Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria and
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
63. Thus, his attempts at distinguishing the attorney-engineer relationship from the
attorney-psychiatrist relationship, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 100, are
similarly misplaced. Federal Judge David Bazelon, one of the giants in the field of
legal psychiatry, has put the issue in proper perspective by noting:
[D]iffidence in the face of scientific expertise is conduct unbecoming a court.
Very few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are economists, aeronautical
engineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. For some reason, however, many
people seem to accept judicial scrutiny of, say, the effect of a proposed dam or, fish
life, while they reject similar scrutiny of the effect of psychiatric treatment on human
lives . . . . [Ilt can hardly be that we are more concerned for the salmon than the
schizophrenic.
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 743 (1969).
He continues:
When the limited function of a judge in reviewing administrative determinations is
borne in mind, there seems little to distinguish psychiatry from, say, radio broad-
casting. No judge would claim the ability to prescribe a particular therapy for a
"chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic." But neither would any judge allocate
frequencies to avoid interference. That is not his task in either case; his role rather
is to determine whether a capable expert has studied the problem fully and reached
a defensible result.
Id. at 745. See also Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process, SCIENTIFIc AM.,
June 1974, at 18, 23.
64. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 100.
65. Id. at 105 n.8.
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Similarly, in ascribing a desire to "show the psychiatrist up in court""6
to the nascent law student, Peszke quotes what he passes off as a "ver-
batim piece of advice to an attorney acting on behalf of an incarcerated
patient."0
If there is a hearing before a neutral psychiatric arbiter, concentrate
all of your effort into getting him or her incensed with the inadequacy
of the hospital psychiatrist, the facility and the treatment resources.
This may not be hard to do in many cases; the hospital psychiatrist is
likely to be foreign, poorly trained, under-staffed and over-worked.
The board psychiatrist will probably be much more 'established' and
orthodox. Put him in the position of either having to endorse what
the hospital wants to do-of having to underwrite obvious inade-
quacy or of being willing to go after the inadequacies himself on
behalf of the patient. 8
This quotation, however, is wrenched out of context. The author's
point was to show how a competent psychiatrist can effectively cross-
examine an incompetent psychiatrist." Sadly, Peszke misses the main
thrust of the article he uses to support his contention.
This is a troubling work, in the same way that a bad performance
of Wagner's Gbtterdammerung, for example, is more troubling than
a bad pop music concert. Expectations are so much higher and so much
more can go wrong. The work becomes in the long run little more
than an anti-lawyering polemic; if Dr. Peszke were treating a patient
who spoke as author Peszke writes, it is inconceivable that he would
not make note of the full range of ego defenses used: projection, de-
fensiveness, denial, fixation, just to name a few."' Peszke has at-
tempted to produce a manifesto by which the medical profession can
defend itself against the misguided and ill-fated onslaughts of the law.
Although his articulation of the medical position is not unreasonable
(given his basic assumptions), and some of his recommendations do
make sense, his underlying misconceptions make this work, for want
of a better word, a potentially dangerous one.
This book may be just the tip of an iceberg of anti-lawyering work,:
by medical professionals, or it may be aberrational. It is especially
66. Id. at 136.
67. Id. at 140 n.10.
68. Id.
69. See Silverberg, The Civil Commitment Process: Basic Considerations, I
LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 103, 110 (P.L.I. ed. 1973). The author
of that article, former head of the Patients' Advocacy Service at St. Elizabeth's Hospital,
is currently chairman of the American Bar Association Commission on the Mentally
Disabled.
70. See, e.g., C. BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 88-107
(1955); C. HALL, A PRIMER OF FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY 85-97 (1954); J. PAGE, PSY-
CHOPATHOLOGY 12-13 (4th ed. 1973). To be more colloquial, as an ancient proverb
goes, he who is able to see a fly on someone else is often unable to see an elephant on
himself.
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disconcerting at a time when a significant number of psychiatrists are
producing books7 and articles72 which are aimed at lessening discord
between the professions and when doctors and lawyers are finally
coming together professionally and regularly to discuss mental health
problems." '  Dr. Peszke expresses a point of view that is evidently a
popular one with more than several doctors; hopefully, his professional
brethren will deal with it in a somewhat more dispassionate manner
than that in which it was written.
MICHAEL L. PERLIN
Director, Division of Mental
Health Advocacy
Department of the
Public Advocate
State of New Jersey
71. See note 15 supra; R. SADOFF, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (1975).
72. See, e.g., Kopolow, A Review of Major Implications of the O'Connor v. Donald-
son Decision, 133 AM. J. PSYCmAT. 379 (1976).
73. In March 1976, the Menninger Foundation and the American Bar Association
Commission on the Mentally Disabled, for instance, co-sponsored a National Conference
on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Disabled.
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